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COMMENTS
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA:
THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE DISPUTE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1925, Argentina and Great Britain have been engaged in
a significant diplomatic dispute over sovereign rights on the Antarctic continent. 1 During the last fifteen years, the provisions of the
Antarctic Treaty 2 have resulted in a relaxation of tensions between
the two countries, but the truce is an uneasy one. Most legal writers
on the subject of sovereignty in Antarctica have generally regarded
Argentina's claim to disputed Antarctic territory as distinctly inferior to that of Great Britain. 3 Yet a thorough examination of sovereignty in the Antarctic context indicates that resolution of the conflict between the two nations will be a close question.
The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain has its origin
in a confusing web of conflicting theories concerning the acquisition
of territorial sovereignty. Twentieth century discussions by eminent
legal writers are replete with abundant references to such terms as
occupatio, terra nullius, animus occupandi, corpus possessionis,
effective occupation, annexation, sectors, contiguity, continuity,
peaceful and continuous display of authority, and discovery. From
the midst of these theories arises the present legal confusion over the
various national claims to the Antarctic continent. 4 It is no surprise
that there has been very little agreement among the claimant states
and their proponents over the ultimate disposition of Antarctic
claims.
The various theories of territorial sovereignty do not exist solely
in an academic vacuum, however. The issue of territorial sover1. Memorial of the United Kingdom, Antarctica Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 8, 26 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Memorial of the United Kingdom].
2. Antarctic Treaty, done December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961). Several countries have made claims to various portions
of the Antarctic continent. The Antarctic Treaty operates to place these claims in a suspended state. Those nations with sovereign designs upon the continent have not waived their
claims by becoming parties to the Treaty; however, the Treaty prohibits expansion of those
claims or the assertion of new ones. This article will focus upon the British and Argentine
claims to a particular section of the Antarctic continent. Claims advanced by other nations
to the remainder of Antarctica are beyond the scope of this discussion.
3. See, for example, notes 9, 18, 32, & 40 infra and accompanying text.
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eignty has been addressed in three significant cases which are particularly applicable to the Antarctic problem. The Island of Palmas
Case 5 concerned a dispute between the Netherlands and the United
States over sovereign rights to a small island in the South Pacific.
The Clipperton Island Case 6 resulted in a determination that France
and not Mexico retained sovereignty over an uninhabited guano
island off the Mexican coast. Finally, despite Norway's assertions
to the contrary, the Permanent Court of International Justice held
Denmark to be the rightful sovereign over all of Greenland in the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland. 7
The purpose of this article is to examine the relevant arguments
of Argentina and Great Britain and, in light of an analysis of the
theories of territorial sovereignty and prior decisions, to suggest
that, should the dispute be referred for decision to the International
Court of Justice, Argentina has a formidable array of arguments at
her disposal. It may be argued that the opportunity
for decision by
..
the Court is foreclosed by the existence of the Antarctic Treaty, that
the issue of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica is moot. It is submitted, however, that the possibility of a Court determination is a
substantial one for three significant reasons.
First, in reference to the dispute between Argentina and Britain, there is already historical precedent for judicial action: in 1955,
Great Britain formally filed an application and invited Chile and
Argentina to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in order to
obtain a determination of the issue. Chile and Argentina declined,
and the cases were dismissed from the Court's list. 8 Second, an
examination of articles XII(l)(a), XII(2)(a), and XII(2)(c) of the
Antarctic Treaty indicates the relative ease with which a contracting party can extricate itself from the treaty provisions. 9 Assuming
for the moment that Argentina has a reasonable opportunity to
prevail if the dispute is brought before the Court, there is a distinct
possibility that Argentina would not only avail herself of the treaty
termination provisions but would initiate Court action herself, in
5. (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
6. (Mexico v. France), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1105 (1931), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
7. [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53.
8. Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina), [1956] I.C.J. 12; (United Kingdom
v. Chile), id. at 15. Chile has also advanced a claim to part of the territory involved in the
Anglo-Argentine dispute . The two Latin American nations, however, have informally agreed
to resolve their dispute subsequent to an invalidation of Britain's claim.
9. Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 311 (1975).
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effect turning the diplomatic tables on Great Britain. Third, the
prospects of technological advance and improved accessibility to
mineral resources in the Antarctic may prove too great a strain
for the treaty to withstand.1° Should the Antarctic Treaty be renounced, even by relatively few of the contracting parties, the subsequent scramble for mineral wealth would serve to resurrect the
tangled complexities of territorial claims. The Eastern Greenland
Case is proof positive that "such a question can be handled judicially." 11
II.

THEORIES OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

The germinal concept in any discussion of territorial sovereignty is that of peaceful and continuous display of state authority,
for it is from this concept that the overwhelming number of variant
theories springs. Peaceful and continuous display of authority, simply stated, is the requirement that a state demonstrate that it has
acquired valid title over given territory and has continued to exert
its authority through "the actual display of state activities. " 12 The
Permanent Court of International Justice has determined that the
concept of peaceful and continuous display of authority consists of
two distinct elements: (1) the intention and will to act as sovereign,
and (2) some actual display of authority .13
The first element is readily cognizable; a state need only assert
its sovereign rights to given territory by way of decree in order to
comply with the requirement. The second element, however, is less
easily applied. The claimant state must display, by means of some
outwardly demonstrable exercise, the authority which lends support
to its initial desire to incorporate the territory. The Court has emphasized that this display of authority is insufficient if exerted only
at the time title is first created. The claimant state is required to
continue its display of authority, since the state's effective occupation of the territory "would be inconceivable, if effectiveness were
required only for the act of acquisition and not equally for the maintenance of the right." 14 The Court has indicated thatthe concept of
peaceful and continuous display of authority is the cornerstone of
10. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM.
J. INT'L L. 217, 223 (1974).
11. Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 119 (1947).
12. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 875.
13. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933) P.C.I.J ., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46.
14. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 876.
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territorial sovereignty; it is the "sound and natural criterium" in
deciding whether title to given territory is valid as against any
other state. 15
A.

Discovery

A relative minority of authority has promulgated the theory
that discovery alone, without any further action by the claimant
state, is sufficient to acquire title to territory. Great Britain has
advanced this theory in order to buttress her claim to certain areas
within the Antarctic region.1 6 Prior to the sixteenth century, discovery per se was deemed sufficient to acquire sovereign rights, and it
has been stated that those states "which are so unfortunate as to
be without any coastline facing the Antarctic" and, therefore, unable to avail themselves of the sector theory, discussed below, 17 have
been forced to resurrect the ancient discovery theory in order to
protect their claims. 18
The discovery theory, however, has been repudiated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Discovery, "without any subsequent
act," is insufficient to prove sovereignty over the territory claimed. 19
The court, however, has not entirely denied the utility of discovery
in acquiring territorial sovereignty. Rather, discovery alone has
been held to be a potential tool for obtaining inchoate title, and this
title can be perfected, within a reasonable time, by an effective
occupation of the territory claimed. The court has specified that an
inchoate title, acquired by means of discovery, cannot prevail over
the peaceful and continuous display of authority exercised by a rival
state. 20
The rationale behind the rejection of the discovery theory is
readily apparent upon review of the existing situation in the Antarctic. The overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain
demonstrate the confusion over factual bases for establishment of
territorial sovereignty. The Court would be confronted with myriad
15. Id. at 840, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 877.
16. Comment, International Law-Claims to Sovereignty-Antarctica, 28 S. CAL. L.
REV. 386, 392 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Claims].
17. See text accompanying notes 33-45 infra.
18. Note, The Validity of Claims of Sovereignty over Antarctic Lands, 5 INTRA. L. REV.
112, 120 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Validity of Claims] .
19. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 846,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 884.
20. Id. at 846, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 884; see 0. SvARLIEN, THE EASTERN GREENLAND CASE
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 55 (1964).
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assertions of discovery by a variety of explorers and little hope of
eventually sorting out the actual facts. Moreover, the states which
base their claims of sovereignty on discovery alone belie their own
acceptance of the theory: they continue their attempts to shore up
sovereign claims by resorting to a "back door" use of effective occupation. 21 It is therefore clear that discovery per se is not a viable,
valid method of acquiring territorial sovereignty.
B.

Occupation

The doctrine of effective occupation as a basis for territorial
sovereignty is the prevalent theory espoused by modern authority.
According to Moore's classic definition, "[ t]itle by occupation is
gained by the discovery, use, and settlement of territory not occupied by a civilized power. " 22 The doctrine has its beginnings in the
Roman law of property which embodied the notion that the owner's
control over the res was an essential element. The logical underpinning of the doctrine was that only the exercise of sufficient control
over the property would ensure efficient use of it by those "best in
a position" to do so. 23 In applying the occupation doctrine to the
acquisition of territory, the state assumes the role of owner and is
therefore subject to several requirements in order to maintain clear
and effective title. First, regardless of a private citizen's relation to
his state, such citizen's discovery and occupation of territory is not
sufficient to establish sovereign rights unless that state promptly
endorses the citizen's actions. 24 Second, in order to meet the Court's
requirement of peaceful and continuous display of authority, the
state must ensure that its inchoate title is not invalidated by the
subsequent activities of a rival state. Occupation is the positive
method to protect against such an eventuality .25
During the early years of application of the occupation doctrine, in strict accordance with Moore's definition, settlement was
viewed as the only method by which to meet the requirements of
effective occupation. In light of such an interpretation, exercise of
sovereignty over desolate, uninhabited regions was deemed impossible since the inability to settle such areas precluded satisfaction of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Claims, supra note 16, at 392.
1 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 258 (1906).
Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 319.
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 321-22.
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an element of effective occupation. 26 The modern approach has been
to temper such a rigid requirement in view of two significant practical considerations. First, various states, hampered by the stricter
view, simply ignored it; 27 second, with the advent of state interest
in desolate areas, specifically the polar regions, the need to relax the
settlement requirement became particularly apparent. 28 The effect
of relaxation of the standard, however, was to create a basic uncertainty: in the absence of permanent settlement, what did effective
occupation mean?
According to Bernhardt, "[e]ffectiveness should be viewed as
the objective manifestation of a continuous development of control
commencing with discovery and subsequent inchoate title and continuing by permanent settlement and administration." 29 This definition of effectiveness, however, contains the requirement of permanent settlement and would seem to preclude the possibility of effective occupation in Antarctica. The author continues:
To maintain that actual continuous possession is required in a
largely uninhabited land is to misconstrue the real nature of
occupatio. Effective possession requires only that degree of control
which is necessary under the totality of the circumstances prevalent
in the area to make the presence of authority of the occupying state
felt by and against all others . It is therefore a flexible and comparative standard . . . . 30

The permanent settlement requirement has disappeared, but we are
left with a rather indefinite and ambiguous standard as a replacement.
Other authorities have also attempted to come to grips with the
meaning of effectve occupation under the less strict view. Von der
Heydte has promulgated the principle of virtual effectiveness, but
has fallen short of concretizing the meaning of the term:
The consciousness of an existing power which is capable of being
exerted everywhere must penetrate the whole country, even if in fact
such power, radiating from some points of support, becomes manifest only in relatively few acts displaying such sovereignty. In a
26. See Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations, 4 AM.

J. INT'L

L. 265, 267 (1910).
27. Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International fow, 29 AM. J . INT'L L. 448, 462 (1935).
28. P . JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 141.
29. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 322.
30. Id. at 323.
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given case on the one hand, the possibility, and on the other the fear,
of a p1.mitive expedition corresponds even more to the intrinsic sense
of effectiveness than a police station in every [district]. 31

The indefiniteness of effective occupation continues to exist, despite
the valiant efforts of legal writers to place the definition within
practical, concrete parameters. 32
C.

Sectors

The sector theory, devised by Canada, was first applied to the
Arctic. 33 Under the sector theory, a state with territory which borders the Arctic and which extends within the Arctic Circle
may claim all of the area between a base line connecting the meridians of longitude marking the limits of its easterly and westerly frontiers, and extending as far north as the final intersection of those
meridians at the North Pole. 34

This division of the polar icecap into "pie slices" has been applied
by several claimant states to the Antarctic. Since no state's territory
extends within the Antarctic Circle, however, a variation of the
Arctic model has been devised. The proponents of the sector theory
in Antarctica base the longitudinal borders of their territorial claims
on the extent of their discovery and exploration of the region; the
outer limit of the "pie slice" is formed by the 60th parallel. 35
The characteristics of polar sectors have no relation to the principle of peaceful and continuous display of authority. The sector
theory is unconcerned with the presence or absence of state control,
no matter how ill-defined; rather, the theory posits a unique relationship between the claimant state and the particular territory in
question. 36 Since the sector theory presumably departs from the
peaceful and continuous display requirement, some authorities have
gone to great lengths to distinguish between the Arctic and Antarctic models. Bernhardt offers four significant distinctions: (1) Antarctica possesses a geological land base while the Arctic is formed
solely of ice, (2) unlike the claimant states in the Arctic model, no
state's continental land mass projects within the Antarctic circle,
31. Von der Heydte, supra note 27, at 465.
32. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 113. See, e.g., Hyde, Acquisition of Sovereignty
over Polar Areas, 19 low AL. REV. 286, 288 (1934).
33. G. SMEDAL, ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 54 (1931).
34. Hyde, supra note 32, at 289.
35. Id. at 291-92; Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 117-18.
36. Hyde, supra note 32, at 289.
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(3) unlike its northern counterpart, the Antarctic region is likely
to become a center of increasing activity, and (4) the Antarctic sectors themselves, as presently delimited, are "contradictory and
impractical. " 37 Hyde's distinction between the two models rests
upon the application of the theories of continuity and contiguity,
discussed below. Since these theories have some application in the
Arctic, they provide a foundation for the sector theory as utilized
there. These two theories, however, are presumed to have no application in the Antarctic, and the sector theory therefore loses its
foundation. 38 Hayton's difficulty with the Antarctic model is
based upon the use of the 60th parallel as the outer limit of the territorial claim:
Sectors . . . should properly begin with their base on the mainland
and project toward the offshore territories. As it is, the Antarctic
sectors are based on an arbitrary Parallel on the high seas and
project toward an alien mainland. 39

Waldock, a proponent of the British sector theory, asserts that the
distinctions between Arctic and Antarctic sector models are exaggerated. He contends that Antarctic sectors are not arbitarily delimited but are "framed as geographical extensions of land claimed,
whether rightly or wrongly, to be already under the sovereignty of
the· sector states. " 40
By far the greatest objection to the sector theory is that it has
no foundation in or application to traditional precepts of international law. The theory has been variously described as "a watereddown concept of acquisition," 41 "legally irrelevant," 42 "contrary to
every legal system and entirely unwarranted, " 43 and as not having
"achieved the status of a legal principle in international law." 44
There are those, however, who assert that the Antarctic situation,
because of its unique problems, .has given the sector theory a cloak
of legal respectability: "the sector principle as applied at least to
Antarctica is now a part of the accepted international legal order. " 45
37. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 336-37.
38. Hyde, supra note 32, at 291.
39. Hayton, The "American" Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 603 (1956).
40. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 311, 340 (1948).
41. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 338.
42. Hayton, supra note 39, at 606.
43. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 121-22.
44. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 338.
45. Reeves, Antarctic Sectors, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1939); see, e.g., Waldock,
supra note 40, at 341. Contra, Elder, Decision on Polar Sovereignty by Student Moot Court,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 656, 656-57 (1947).
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Contiguity, Continuity-Hinterland, Uti Possidetis
CONTIGUITY

The contiguity doctrine has been advocated at times by states
attempting to lay claim to islands located off their coastlines but
outside the limits of their territorial waters. The fact that an island
is located within relative proximity to the claimant state is purported to be a "geographical connexion" between the two land masses and, therefore, a foundation for the exercise of territorial sovereignty.46 It should be noted that the traditional view of the concept
is that it encompasses only the acquisition of islands, not continental land masses. The modern justification for the concept is that the
state relies upon the island claimed as a source of sustenance. 47
The contiguity theory, as applied to the Antarctic, has been
vigorously attacked on the grounds that it flies in the face of effective occupation requirements. Antarctica, it is argued, is a continent
in and of itself with no "geographical connexion" to any other continent. "No State can claim that it is 'adjacent' or 'contiguous,' or
that it controls the coastline at any point. " 48 Chile and Argentina,
on the other hand, maintain that the highlands of the Antarctic
continent are merely extensions of the Andes range, part of which
is submerged between the South American and Antarctic land masses. The two Latin American countries support their claim by reference to geological data. 49 This argument, while forceful, ignores the
traditional emphasis placed on the continent-island relationship of
the contiguity doctrine. Von der Heydte, however, dismisses the
strict traditional interpretation. He argues that the contiguity doctrine, properly applied, has its roots in the principle of virtual effectiveness, and there is, therefore, no justification or logic in restricting its application solely to islands located off a claimant state's
coast. 50 Von der Heydte's analysis reaches a position diametrically
opposed by the authorities previously mentioned: "[b]esides effective occupation, geographic contiguity is recognized to be a full and
sufficient sovereign title." 51
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Waldock, supra note 40, at 341.
Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 341.
Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 117; Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 341.
Claims, supra note 16, at 395.
Von der Heydte, supra note 27, at 470-71.
Id. at 463.
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CONTINUITY-HINTERLAND

The continuity-hinterland theories are close relatives of the
contiguity doctrine. They are discussed here together because they
embody, generally speaking, the same principle. The theories hold
that a state which occupies or controls a coastal area may extend
its claim inland "up to either the middle line of the continent, the
outer reach of the water shed or some other obvious natural boundary."52
The continuity-hinterland theories are sometimes used in support of the sector principle, as applied in the Antarctic. The eastwest boundaries of the claimant state, formed by the extent of discovery and exploration along the Antarctic coastline, are projected
· inland to the South Pole completing formation of the "pie slice. " 53
The argument is made, however, that effective control is a necessary
prerequisite to a valid claim of sovereignty, and on this basis the
continuity-hinterland theories, though in vogue during the nineteenth century, were never recognized as valid. 54
3.

UTI

PossmETis

The uti possidetis doctrine is advanced exclusively by the Latin
American nations which claim sovereign rights in the Antarctic.
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that Argentina and Chile, when
they ceased to be colonies of Spain, succeeded to Spanish rights of
sovereignty as granted by the Papal Bull, Inter Caetera. 55. Under the
uti possidetis doctrine, therefore, no territory in the Western Hemisphere is considered res nullius, and all holdings of the former Spanish empire are transferred, by way of succession, to the Latin American nations as the "legitimate heirs" of Spain. 56
The Argentine-Chilean invocation of uti possidetis as the foundation of their claims to territory in the Antarctic is generally acknowledged to be of little utility. The validity of the Papal Bull
itself is seriously questioned, 57 and, assuming for the moment that
the Bull is valid, Argentina and Chile have inherited, at best, an
inchoate title to the territory claimed. The two countries would
simply assume the position of Spain in regard to the inchoate titles
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 114; Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 342-43.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 605.
Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 345.
See van der Heydte, supra note 27, at 451-52.
Claims, supra note 16, at 394.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 598 n.69a.
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and would still be required to follow the general precepts of territorial acquisition: discovery followed by effective occupation. Decrees are not sufficient; the successor claimant state must prove the
perfection and maintenance of its title. 58 The doctrine of uti
possidetis "has proved to be so indefinite and ambiguous that it has
become somewhat discredited," 59 and one authority has gone so far
as to assert that invocation of the doctrine would receive short shrift
by disinterested judges or arbiters. 60
III.

SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE COURT: THE CASES

As has been previously stated, the foregoing theories of acquisition of territorial sovereignty do not exist in a vacuum. The issue of
sovereignty has been squarely addressed in three significant cases.
One commentator has advanced the argument that the three cases
discussed below would be of little assistance in clarifying the situation as it exists in the Antarctic. The argument is that, if the Court
were asked for an advisory opinion or judgment on sovereignty in
Antarctica, there would be nothing in the way of precedent upon
which the Court could base its decision:
This would mean that the Court must decide a completely new
question of law with no rules or precedents to serve as guides. The
Eastern Greenland, Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and other
cases are sufficiently different on their facts to be inapplicable. In
nearly all, there was a long history of exploration and assertion of
sovereignty extending over several hundred years. Very few of the
reported cases concern territory completely uninhabited at the time
of discovery, and none involve an area completely incapable of habitation at the time of the decision. 61

It is submitted that such distinctions do not in fact exist and that
the three cases examined below are particularly applicable to the
Antarctic situation. First, a long history of exploration and assertion
of sovereignty is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Judge Huber stated
in the Island of Palmas Case:
58. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 346; Hayton, supra note 39, at 601; Waldock, supra note
40, at 326-27.
59. Waldock, supra note 40, at 325.
60. Hayton, supra note 39, at 603.
61. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 123. While the decisions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and the International Court of Justice are not governed by the principle of stare decisis, nevertheless, the analysis and rationale of the early sovereignty cases are
heavily relied upon in subsequent Court determinations.
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it is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to
a very far distant period. It may suffice that such display existed
. . . long enough to enable any Power . . . to have . . . a reasonable
possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary
to her real or alleged rights. 62

Second, the Clipperton Island Case concerned territory which was
completely uninhabited. Finally, Antarctica is not now, nor would
it be at the time of decision, completely incapable of habitation.
Argentina has manned an observatory on Laurie Island, in the
South Orkneys, since 1904 on a continuous, year-round basis. 63
An examination of the decisions in the following cases provides
a familiarity with the guidelines used in approaching the issue of
territorial sovereignty over isolated, desolate areas. Such an examination cannot help but provide the necessary tools for an analysis
of the legal status of territorial claims in the Antarctic.
A.

The Island of Palmas Case

The Island of Palmas decision is founded upon the seminal
concept of peaceful and continuous display of state authority. This
concept receives primary emphasis and is regarded as sine qua non
in the acquisition of territorial sovereignty. Of what exactly does the
display of authority consist? Since the display of state authority and
the right of sovereignty which it confers cannot under international
law exist as an exercise of sovereignty in the abstract, such display
must be accompanied by "concrete manifestations." 64 These manifestations may take on different forms depending upon various conditions of time and place, and Judge Huber specified that the habitability of the region claimed is a significant factor in determining
the extent of manifestation required. 65 There is, however, an additional requirement. Not only must the display of authority be evidenced by concrete manifestation, but it must also be continuous
and "follow the conditions required by the evolution of law. " 66 In
applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the case, Judge
Huber determined that the United States, which had acquired title
to Palmas Island through discovery, recognition by treaty, and con62. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 867,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 908.
63. Hayton, supra note 39, at 587.
64. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 876.
65. Id. at 840, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 877.
66. Id. at 845, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 883.
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tiguity, nevertheless possessed an inferior claim to the island. The
United States had "not established the fact that sovereignty so
acquired was effectively displayed at any time. " 67 In effect, despite
the abstract title purportedly created in the United States by virtue
of the theories advanced, the United States had never furnished the
Netherlands or the court with concrete manifestations of the exercise of sovereignty. Although Moore's settlement requirement 68 has
been vitiated and replaced by a more relaxed standard, some act or
series of acts, continuous in nature, must be exhibited.
Bernhardt states that Judge Huber was "the first to circumscribe" the growing body of exceptions to the effective occupation
doctrine "by putting relative bounds on it." 69 The minimum degree
of effective control is the peaceful and continuous display of state
authority, evidenced by concrete manifestations which may vary
according to the circumstances of time and place. Ho~ does this
principle affect the various claims to Antarctic territory? Have
there been concrete manifestations of display of authority by the
claimant states sufficient to meet the Palmas Island standard?
Bernhardt maintains that there were not permanent settlements or
continuous state activities on the Antarctic continent until the
1950's. 70 He therefore concludes that Antarctica "fails to fulfill the
exceptions enunciated in the Palmas [Case]." 71 The claimant state
must still establish that it can exercise control over the region
claimed, and bare assertions of claims, without proof of the power
to exercise control, will not suffice as proof of sovereignty. Hyde is
in substantial agreement with this position since he contends that
"relaxation should be confined to the waiving of settlement as a
necessary condition for the perfecting of a right of sovereignty." 72
The positions of Bernhardt and Hyde, based upon a narrow
construction of the principle enunciated in the Palmas Case, would
seem to close the door to all states claiming sovereign rights in the
Antarctic. Such contentions, however, are an oversimplification of
that principle. The concept of continuous and peaceful display of
state authority was sufficiently qualified to allow the possibility of
valid claims to portions of Antarctic territory.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71 .
72 .

Id. at 867, 22 AM . J . INT'L L. at 907 (emphasis added).
See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 329.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 331.
Hyde, supra note 32, at 293-94.
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While asserting that the court is inclined to give greater weight
to acts of display of state authority, Judge Huber nevertheless
stated that there may well be circumstances where such acts of
display will not be required:
The fact that a state cannot prove display of sovereignty as regards
[partly uninhabited or unsubdued portions] of territory cannot
forthwith be interpreted as showing that sovereignty is inexistent.
Each case must be appreciated in accordance with the particular
circumstances. 73

In discussing the need for concrete manifestation of display of authority, Judge Huber left another slight crack in what Bernhardt
and Hyde view as an impenetrable wall. The display of authority
required, and the nature of such display, should be in precise relation to the territory in dispute. Bernhardt maintains that the minimum requirement for such display is some form of effective administration, 74 but Judge Huber indicated that "[i]t is not necessary
that there should be a special administration established in [the]
territory." 75 It therefore logically follows that, absent some particular requirement for "special administration" of given Antarctic territory, Bernhardt's minimum requirement of effective administration could be waived without prejudice to a claimant state's sovereign rights.
There are three other principles set out in the Palmas Island
Case which are relevant to the discussion of Anglo-Argentine rights.
The first principle concerns a question which arises again in the
Eastern Greenland Case: if one state, at some time in the past,
recognized or admitted to the sovereignty of another state over given
territory, does such recognition or admission create a presumption
of sovereignty in the second state? Judge Huber's response is categorical: "no presumptions of this kind are to be applied in international arbitrations, except under express stipulation. It remains for
the Tribunal to decide . . . ." 76
The second principle is perhaps more subtle, and it is easily
glossed over in the context of its presentation. After examining the
evidence marshalled by the Netherlands and the United States in
73. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 855,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 894.
74. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 332.
75. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 857,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 896.
76. Id. at 864, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 904-05.
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support of their respective claims, Judge Huber concluded:
"[ t]here is moreover no evidence which would establish any act of
display of sovereignty over the island by Spain or another Power,
such as might counter-balance or annihilate the manifestations of
Netherlands sovereignty." 77 Clearly, the notion of counter-balance
could prove to be a critical one, particularly in its application to the
situation in the Antarctic. After reviewing Judge Huber's exhaustive analysis of the concept of peaceful and continuous display of
authority, it is easy to conclude that in any given case there is but
one state which could meet the criteria required for the exercise of
sovereignty. But the notion of counter-balance dispels such a conclusion.
Lastly, the theory of contiguity is examined in the Island of
Palmas Case. Notwithstanding von der Heydte's assertion of the
validity of the principle, 78 Judge Huber appears to have dismissed
it entirely:
[I]t is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its territory
forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable
size). 79

Bernhardt apparently accepts this generalization and concludes
that the principle of contiguity "has now for all practical purposes
fallen into desuetude and has no adherents in modern international
law." 80 This, too, may be an oversimplification, for Judge Huber,
while refusing to place the imprimatur of international law on the
contiguity theory, nevertheless conceded that the principle may well
have its place outside the realm of the law:
The principle of contiguity, in regard to islands, may not be out of
place when it is a question of alloting them to one State rather than
another, either by agreement between the Parties, or by a decision
not necessarily based on law . . . .81

Once again, Judge Huber has refrained from turning the key in the
lock.
77. Id. at 868, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 909 (emphasis added).
78. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
79. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 854,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 893 (emphasis added).
80. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 342.
81. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 854,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 893 (emphasis added).
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The Clipperton Island Case

In order fully to appreciate the significance of the Clipperton
Island Case, decided three years after the Palmas decision, a brief
recitation of the facts is necessary. France discovered the island in
1857. In 1858, a French commercial ship, L 'Amiral, returned to the
island in order annex it to France. On board was a commissioner of
the French government who drew up an act, in accordance with
instructions from the Minister of Marine, in which sovereignty over
the island was proclaimed for France. The ship itself was never able
to reach the island, but some members of the crew went ashore by
means of a small boat. The crew returned to the ship without having
left "any sign of sovereignty" ashore, and L 'Amiral departed on
November 20, 1858. From that date until the end of 1887, at which
time France lodged a protest with the United States over the presence of American citizens collecting guano on the island, "no positive and apparent act of sovereignty can be recalled either on the
part of France or on the part of any other Powers." 82 In 1897, Mexico
dispatched a gunboat to the island, despite the French claim of
sovereignty, and proclaimed that Clipperton was territory
"belonging to her for a long time." In opposition to the French
position, Mexico, invoking the uti possidetis doctrine, claimed that
the island had been first discovered by the Spanish and therefore
belonged to Mexico as Spain's successor. 83 The dispute was submitted to Victor Emmanuel III, the King of Italy, for arbitration.
The arbiter dismissed Mexico's invocation of uti possidetis on
the grounds that Mexico had failed to demonstrate first, that Spain
had had the right to incorporate the island and, second, that either
Spain or Mexico "had effectively exercised the right." 84 In the absence of such effective exercise, Clipperton Island, at the time of the
French proclamation of November, 1858, "was in the legal situation
of territorium nullius, and, therefore, susceptible of occupation. " 85
Victor Emmanuel then turned to the French claim and proceeded
to apply, and expand, the principles enunciated in the Island of
Palmas Case.
The principle of peaceful and continuous display of authority
receives a slightly different interpretation in the Clipperton Island
82. Clipperton Island Case (Mexico v. France), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1108, 26 AM.

J. INT'L L. at 391.
83. Id. at 1109, 26 AM . J . INT'L L. at 392.
84. Id. at 1110, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
85. Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
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Case. The two elements of intent and actual display are present, but
the second element is phrased in a significant manner:
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force
of law, besides the animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. The
taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which
the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question
and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. 86

In applying this principle to the factual situation in the Clipperton
Island Case, it is readily apparent that France indicated her intent
to exercise sovereignty; the proclamation of November, 1858, satisfies the first requirement. But by what act, or series of acts, did
France reduce the island to her possession? The French government
performed only two acts during the time period examined: (1) the
proclamation of annexation in 1858, and (2) the protest lodged with
the United States in 1887. In light of Judge Huber's insistence, in
the Island of Palmas Case, upon continuous display of authority
through concrete manifestations, it would seem that the French
claim must fail. The arbiter, however, noted that, while some form
of active, continuous administration is ordinarily required to comply with the second element, such activity is only a procedural step
in the taking of possession. In fact, he stated that there may be no
need for such activity at all:
There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have recourse to
this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was
completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of
possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation
is thereby completed. 87

In effect, the continuous display of authority, so heavily underscored by Judge Huber, has been waived in a case concerning uninhabited territory. The single act of proclamation by the French has
been held sufficient to validate the claim of French sovereignty.
In applying the Clipperton rationale to the Antarctic situation,
Bernhardt concludes that the case must be distinguished. He asserts that the Clipperton formula is designed for an uninhabited but
small island which is nevertheless susceptible of territorial occupa86. Id., 26 AM . J. INT'L L. at 393.
87 . Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394.
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tion and administration. The Antarctic continent, he concludes, "is
not amenable to so cavalier a treatment." 88 But the grounds for such
a distinction between Clipperton and the Antarctic are invalid, for
it must be emphasized that, although Clipperton may very well
have been susceptible to some form of occupation or administration,
the arbiter nevertheless expressly dispensed with the necessity for
such activity. In addition, the language of the decision was not
directed merely at islands; rather, the subject matter was termed
uninhabited "territory." The unmistakable result of the Clipperton
Island Case is a further relaxation of the traditional standards for
acquisition of territorial sovereignty.
C.

The Eastern Greenland Case

The Eastern Greenland Case represents the final rung on the
chronological ladder of standard-relaxation. The case indicates that
the concept of peaceful and continuous display of state authority
has clearly expanded beyond the guidelines so clearly outlined in
the Island of Palmas Case. The change in approach is not a sudden
one, however, and the Court noted, while describing the nature of
the principle, that its lenient view had its foundation in the development of prior case law:
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as
to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries. 89

Having prefaced its opinion with a view toward leniency, the
Court nevertheless asserted that some actual display of authority is
necessary. The Court has not totally abandoned the two-element
requirement for valid claims to sovereignty. As in the Clipperton
case, the intent to exercise sovereign rights is not seriously questioned or analyzed, but what activities qualify to fulfill the requirement of actual display of authority? The Court provided two examples. The first is legislation concerning the disputed area by the
state seeking to prove its claim. Legislation is regarded as "one of
" 90
the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign power .
88. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 330-31.
89. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 46.
90. Id. at 48.
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Almost as an afterthought, the Court asserted that even if such
legislation were directed toward a particular area of colonization in
a given territory, such fact is not grounds for holding that the legislation is "restricted to the colonized area. " 91 In effect, then, legislation directed at a relatively small area of territory may be sufficient
to fulfill the actual display requirement for the entire territory. In
addition to legislation, "concessions granted for the erection of telegraph lines" are deemed manifestations of the exercise of sovereignty, 92 and the Court concluded that these and other similar acts,
combined with a variety of scientific activities, are sufficient to
show that the claimant state has met the two-element requirement
and has established a valid claim of sovereignty. 93
In his dissent, Judge Vogt maintained that Denmark did display the requisite animus possidendi but asked rhetorically whether
Denmark did in fact have the corpus possessionis. 94 One authority
has concluded, with Judge Vogt, that the answer to the question is
a categorical no. He maintains that Denmark prevailed despite "the
obvious weaknesses" in her position. 95 What, then, is the status of
the peaceful and continuous display requirement in light of the
Court's arguably lenient decision? Bernhardt maintains that the
requirement for actual display is still very much in evidence but
adds that the extent of such display "is a relative and not an absolute concept; that is, the requisite degree depends on the activities
of other states in the disputed area. " 96 It is questionable whether the
notion of relative display is of any assistance in clarifying the respective positions of rival claimant states. Relative display is simply
an alternate way of expressing the problem, not of positing a workable solution. A more realistic appraisal of the decision is provided
by Svarlien. He maintains that the Court, while affirming the general concept of peaceful and continuous display, "merely changed
its content, " 97 and the net effect of such change was to reduce the
resulting content "to an ill-defined minimum." 98 Another commentator concludes that the Court's decision demonstrates an abandonment of the two-element requirement altogether.
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

97.
98.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 102.
0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 68.
Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 326.
0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 63.
Id. at 68.
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By [the time of the Eastern Greenland Case], it had become a
matter of expediency; faced with the problem of awarding territory
to one or another State, the court merely gave it to the one with the
better claim, regardless of how weak that claim was in itself. 99

In accordance with Svarlien's analysis of the Eastern Greenland
decision, the consolidation of "territorial titles can best be understood in terms of the evolution and growth of public international
law. "100
IV.

GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA BEFORE THE
COURT

The Anglo-Argentine dispute over Antarctic territory has been
a bitter one, marked by several incidents of a serious nature. The
expedition of the Argentine ship Primera de Mayo in 1942 proclaimed the annexation of an Argentine Antarctic sector and installed commemorative bronze plaques on Deception and Wieneke
Islands. The following year, the British Ambassador personally returned one of the plaques to the Argentine government. 101 Crewmen
of the H. M. S. Carnavon Castle removed the national colors of Argentina from the walls of a whaling factory located on Deception
Island; the colors had apparently been painted there by members
of the Primera de Mayo expedition. 102 Argentina has refused to process mail bearing British stamps produced in the Falkland Islands.103 In 1952, the Argentine navy, resorting to the use of gunfire,
compelled a British scientific expedition to withdraw from the Hope
Bay area, and, in 1953, a British official assisted by a small military
squad dismantled huts on Deception Island which had previously
been constructed by Argentine and Chilean nationals. Two Argentines were arrested. 104 In light of the foregoing incidents, the
frequently cited decision of a student moot court, 105 which held that
allowing polar areas to continue as terra nullius would not generate
international tensions which could lead to war, is decidely inappropriate. With the possible termination of the Antarctic Treaty, a
resolution of the Anglo-Argentine dispute by the International
99. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 114.
100. 0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 58.
101. Hayton, supra note 39, at 589.
102. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 28.
103. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 149.
104. Id.
105. Elder, supra note 45, at 658.
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Court of Justice is a distinct possibility and, in Shakespeare's
phrase, "a consummation devoutly to be wish'd." 106
A.

The Case for Great Britain

Great Britain relies, for the most part, upon the sector theory
as the nucleus of her Antarctic claims. Some authorities have accepted the sector theory, if not as proof of territorial sovereignty, at
least "as a method of asserting territorial claims." 107 The British
adopted the theory in 1917 and proclaimed the boundaries of their
Antarctic sector to be the lines 20° and 80° west longitude; the territories within those boundaries are known as the Falkland Islands
Dependencies. 108 Great Britain's claims to the Antarctic mainland
are based upon the delimitation of this sector, but a distinction is
made between the theories which support the sector claim. The
land bases which form the outer boundaries of the British sector are
said not to be the Falkland Islands; rather, the boundaries are
formed by points on the Antarctic mainland which mark the outer
edge of discoveries and exploration of the continental land mass
itself. 109 It is argued, therefore, that the British sector has its foundation in the continuity-hinterland theory and not in the contiguity
theory espoused by Argentina. The result is that Great Britain has
arguably paid tribute to the accepted modes of territorial acquisition, viz., discovery and occupation, whereas Argentina, by endorsing the contiguity theory as a basis for its sector claim, has ignored
those accepted modes. 110 Regardless of this fine distinction made
between supporting theories, there is authority for holding that
Great Britain "has a very substantial case for many individual territories within [her] sector. " 111
In line with her recognition of the traditional modes of territorial acquisition, Britain has taken great pains to demonstrate the
validity of her claims by detailing the discovery and effective occupation of various territories withfo her sector. The discovery of Graham Land in 1820 is attributed to E. Bransfield, a British naval
officer, and it is contended that the first discoveries of South Georgia, the South Shetland Islands, the South Orkney Islands, and the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111 .

W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act III, Scene I.
G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 285 (3d ed. 1976).
Reeves, supra note 45, at 519.
Waldock, supra note 40, at 340.
Id. at 341.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 584.
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South Sandwich Islands were made by British citizens. 112 In addition, "acts of annexation" were performed in the name of the British
Crown. In juxtaposition to these activities, it is asserted that neither
Spain nor Argentina, as Spain's successor, made any discoveries
whatsoever in the disputed area. 113 These British acts of acquisition
were confirmed by the issuance of Letters Patent in July of 1908 114
and in March of 1917 115 wherein the territorial boundaries of the
sector were proclaimed.
In addition to these arguments in support of her establishment
of primary title, a catalogue of activities is set out as proof of Great
Britain's numerous manifestations of sovereignty. Whaling and
sealing laws are submitted as examples of direct British control over
the area. 116 In fact, such laws are used as a springboard to introduce
what may be a very novel concept: the "reasonable sovereign" standard. Great emphasis is placed upon the fact that Argentina took
no steps to regulate whaling and sealing activities in the region and
therefore did not act "as a prudent sovereign would have done, or
sought to do . . . . " 117 As further examples of British manifestations
of sovereignty, reference is made to the establishment of the
Discovery Committee, 118 the activities of the British Graham Land
Expedition, 119 the organization of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, 120 and, finally, to a list of active British bases maintained in various parts of the disputed territory .121 Thus, it is argued,
the numerous activities of Great Britain within the area of the Falkland Islands Dependencies proves beyond doubt that it "displayed
and exercised its sovereignty" 122 in accordance with the principle of
peaceful and continuous display of state authority as enunciated in
the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island, and Eastern Greenland
Cases. 123
Permanent settlement has not been advanced or mentioned as
112. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 12.
113. Id. at 12-13.
114. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, Declarations Concerning Antarctic Territories, in [194849] INT'L LEGAL Docs. 217, 231-32 (1950).
115. Id. at 233.
116. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 17.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id. at 20.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 32.
123. Id. at 33-34.
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a rationale for the British claim. The various manifestations of British activity in the disputed sector are all of a temporary nature:
summer visits, expeditions, intermittently manned outposts. Waldock, a proponent of the British claims in the Antarctic, discounts
this absence of permanent activity or occupation by emphasizing
the relaxation of standards outlined in the three sovereignty cases:
It is enough if the state displays the functions of a state in a manner
corresponding to the circumstances of the territory, assumes the
responsibility to exercise local administration, and does so in fact
as and when occasion demands. 124

Great Britain will very likely strengthen her position by vigorous attack upon the Argentine claims. Assuming the existence of a
previous, clear Spanish title to the disputed territory, there are six
possible resulting situations, 125 in regard to territorial sovereignty,
under presently accepted precepts of international law. Regardless
of the possibility chosen, Argentina is faced with a serious problem:
presuming an inchoate title is possessed by Argentina, no matter
how obtained, there is a noticeable absence of evidence to indicate
that she has perfected or maintained such title over the disputed
territory.1 26 In addition, as Great Britain has previously emphasized,
Argentina knew of the British claims in 1909 but offered no opposition or protest to such claims when the British Letters Patent of
1908 were brought to the attention of the Argentine Foreign Minister. In fact, the British Minister concluded from the Argentine official's reaction that Argentina did "not dispute the rights of Great
Britain . . .. " 127 On the basis of these weaknesses in the Argentine
position and in view of the extensive activities of the British government within her sector, Waldock asserts that "there is plainly a
124. Waldock, supra note 40, at 336.
125. Hayton considers five situations where some stage of Antarctic sovereignty is
reached by a claimant state. The sixth situation is Antarctica as terra nullius:
(1) Spanish inchoate title persisting;
(2) Spanish title perfected, sovereignty maintained;
(3) Argentine or Chilean inchoate title by proven succession, or rediscovery and
annexation of lapsed Spanish titles;
(4) Argentine or Chilean sovereignty, as successor to perfected title or by maintenance of title perfected after 1810;
(5) Terra nullius;
(6) Inchoate title or sovereignty of a third state established.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 602.
126. Id. at 602-03.
127. Memorial of the United Kindgom, supra note 1, at 22-23. For the counter-argument,
see note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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substantial prima-facie case both in fact and in law for the United
Kingdom's" claim to sovereign rights in the Antarctic. 128
A further, extra-legal, consideration is the 1955 British application for judicial determination of the issue by the Permanent Court
of International Justice. It can be viewed as a positive advantage in
two respects. First, the application was a demonstrable consolidation of British rights:
While the practical wisdom of this type of[ application] proceeding
may sometimes be open to question, there can be no doubt that to
propose arbitration or judicial settlement in appropriate circumstances is a necessary precautionary measure for a State wishing to
safeguard its rights. 129

Second, by placing its application before the Court, Britain has
made her claim, and the legitimate arguments supporting that
claim, a matter of public record. By so doing, Britain may be said
to have captured the advantage in the arena of world diplomacy.1 30
B.

The Case for Argentina

Argentina originally expressed official opposition to the sector
theory, presumably due to the fact that the British had seen fit to
adopt it.13 1 Eventually, however, Argentina did embrace the theory
and proclaimed her sector to extend from 25° to 74° west longitude,
an area located entirely within the boundaries established by Great
Britain.132 While Britain bases its adherence to the sector theory
upon the principle of continuity-hinterland, Argentina supports her
adoption of the theory with the principle of contiguity. Although the
Antarctic continent is approximately 700 miles from the Argentine
coast, it is contended nevertheless that the Palmer Peninsula (labelled Graham Land on British maps) is an extension of the South
American continent and that the two land masses are connected by
a continental shelf.133 It has been noted, despite Waldock's valiant
attempt to demonstrate otherwise, that Great Britain's sector is
based upon the outward projection of longitudinal lines from the
Falkland Islands and not from points of discovery along the Antarc128. Waldock, supra note 40, at 353.
129. S. ROSENNE, THE TIME FACTOR IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 30 n.5 (1960) .
130. See S. RosENNE, THE WORLD CouRT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 161 (1962).
131. Hayton, supra note 39, at 588 .
132. Id. at 590.
133. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 143.
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tic mainland. 134 It appears somewhat paradoxical that Great Britain
can assert, on the one hand, that the Falkland Islands form some
unique relationship with the Antarctic continental land mass and,
on the other hand, that the Argentine claim of a contiguous relationship with the same land mass is somehow illegal and invalid. The
British position is even more questionable in view of the fact that
the Argentine mainland is significantly closer to the continental
land mass than are the Falkland Islands. 135 It should be remembered
that the sector theory has its origin in the Arctic model, first proposed by Canada. 136 One of the requirements for use of the Arctic
model was that the claimant state's territory extend within the
Arctic Circle. While no claimant state can meet that requirement
in the case of the Antarctic model, it is nevertheless significant that
the South American continent projects farther south than any other.
In view of this fact, and in view of Argentina's alleged contiguity
with the Antarctic mainland, Argentina's "failure technically to
penetrate the Antarctic Circle may not be crucial." 137 Finally, in
contrast with the British reliance upon the Falkland Island connection, the Argentine sector model is strategically superior: Argentina's direct proximity with the disputed territory renders its sector
more easily defensible,1 38 and this fact goes straight to the issue of
exertion of state authority or control.
Argentina maintains a "low profile" with respect to the traditional mode of discovery as a tool for territorial acquisition. The
doctrine of uti possidetis is substituted for discovery, and, despite
the fact that the existence of the Antarctic continent was unknown
during the time of the early Spanish explorations, Argentina posits
the validity of Spanish claims, placing heavy emphasis on the fact
that these claims "went undisputed for several hundred years
139
••••"
Despite the fact that a majority of authority finds relatively little merit in the invocation of uti possidetis, one authority
has concluded that the holding in the Eastern Greenland Case lends
credence to the doctrine. The fact that the Court placed significant
emphasis upon the ancient claims of Denmark, while it proportionately relaxed the requirement of occupation, it is argued, demon134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Jessup, supra note 11, at 119.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 604 n.91.
See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 603.
Claims, supra note 16, at 396.
P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 146.
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strates the Court's acceptance of a principle similar to the uti
possidetis doctrine. 140 While such an argument could be advanced
by Argentina, it is admittedly not a strong one.1 41 In lieu of submitting discovery arguments of her own, Argentina might well attack
the basis of British discovery claims on the grounds that discovery,
without more, is insufficient to validate a claim of sovereignty. Reference, by analogy, to British claims in Eastern Antarctica may
prove fruitful:
Britain . . . laid claim to a great expanse of Antarctic territory in
1933, when it was stated at an Imperial Conference that the raising
of the British flag at various points . . . gave that State sovereignty
over "all islands and territories" within [specified] limits. 142

Claims made in such a fashion were rejected out of hand by Judge
Huber in the Island of Palmas Case. 143
Argentina has also proclaimed and confirmed the establishment of primary title to Antarctic territory by means of official
statements. In 1927, a Note addressed to the Director of the Universal Postal Union declared that "Argentine territorial jurisdiction
extends de jure and de facto to the continental area . . . and to
polar territories which have not been delimited." 144 In a Note to the
Chilean Ambassador, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations
made reference to the existence of Argentina's permanent observatory on Laurie Island and stated that Argentina is the only country
" 'which maintains in real form the rule of its sovereignty in the
lands of the Antarctic.' " 145 The content of these statements was
repeated in subsequent official communications including a Note to
the British Foreign Minister in 1953 146 and a Decree-Law published
in 1957.1 47
"Argentina fully realizes that administrative organization of
territory is considered a major act of sovereignty in the perfection
and maintenance of titles. " 148 In accordance with that realization,
140. Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignties in the Antarctic, [1949] Y.B. OF WORLD AFF. 252,
267-68.
141. Claims, supra note 16, at 395.
142. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 119.
143. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
144. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, supra note 114, at 218.
145. Id. at 221.
146. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 146 & n.41.
147. Hanessian, Antarctica: Current National Interests and Legal Realities, [1958] AM.
Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 145, 152 n.17 .
148. Hayton, supra note 39, at 590.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss1/5

26

MacKechnie: Sovereignty in Antarctica

1977]

Sovereignty in Antarctica

145

Argentina, too, has marshalled evidence of her manifestations of
state authority within the disputed area. A substantial number of
bases has been established in the South Shetlands, Graham Land,
and Coats Land. 149 Argentina has issued special postage stamps
which indicate her Antarctic claims. Of considerable significance,
however, is the establishment of permanent outposts in the Antarctic region: "[m]ore important, actual postoffices serving the yearround bases have been in operation since 1947. Argentina's Laurie
Island (South Orkneys) postoffice dates technically from 1904." 150 In
light of Great Britain's failure to establish permanent bases prior to
those of Argentina, the latter nation's most significant argument in
regard to the principle of effective occupation is her maintenance of
a permanent observatory within her designated sector. "Foremost
among Argentine claims . . . is the fact of a meteorological observatory in continuous operation since February 22, 1904, on Laurie
Island in the South Orkneys, just inside accepted 'Antarctic latitudes.' " 151 The permanent, continuous nature of this outpost has
given Argentina, if not an advantage over, at least occupation arguments as persuasive as those of Great Britain. And the significance
of this fact has not been lost on her competitors. "[A]ll major
claimants are now following the Chilean and Argentine lead in the
establishment of permanent (year-round) military, weather service
and scientific encampments in order to be able to show 'continuous
settlement.' " 152
Argentina is certainly not without recourse to the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island, and Eastern Greenland Cases. The end
result of the chronological development of those cases was that little
more than a demonstrable intent to exercise sovereign rights is required to sustain a state's claim, provided no rival state can demonstrate a superior claim.1 53 Given the more logical approach of the
Argentine sector theory, in addition to Argentine manifestations of
state authority, Argentina possesses an equal if not superior claim
to that of Great Britain and therefore has met the judicial prerequisites for a valid claim to sovereignty. Argentina has not limited
herself to advancing a single theory; rather, she has "alleged a valid
claim on any and all theories which might be available." 154
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 31.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 588 n.26.
Id. at 587 (emphasis added); see Claims, supra note 16, at 396.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 599-600.
0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 69.
Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 119-20.
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Argentina might well use an additional argument against the
validity of the British claim: the anti-colonial pronouncements of
the Monroe Doctrine as embodied in the Argentine reservation to
the Rio Treaty.1 55 At the time of the British application to the Permanent Court of International Justice, Argentina cited the provisions of the treaty as grounds for not submitting to the jurisdiction
of the Court. She claimed that the dismantling of Argentine huts
on Deception Island and the arrest of two Argentine nationals there
"were acts of an 'extracontinental Power' against Argentine 'territorial Patrimony.' " 156 In regard to the Monroe Doctrine itself, the
Latin American nations have asserted that it has particular application to the Western Antarctic, 157 and despite the fact that the
United States has refused to recognize any claim of territorial
sovereignty in the Antarctic, the American position is clearly in
support of Argentina in its dispute with Britain:
In [1939] Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that
"considerations of continental defense make it vitally important to
keep for the twenty-one American Republics a clearer title to that
part of the Antarctic continent south of America than is claimed by
any non-American country," a statement currently invoked by
Chile and Argentina in their disputes with Britain. 158

As one authority has stated, the hemispheric nature represented by
such treaties and pronouncements forms a "cornerstone" of the Argentine claim to Antarctic territory .1 59

V.

CONCLUSION

A critical weakness in the British position and one which is
especially vulnerable to Argentine attack is the designation by
Great Britain of the Falkland Islands as the hub of Antarctic activity and the linchpin of the British sector claim. The Falkland Islands, by virtue of the Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917, were made
the source of administrative authority in the British Antarctic; indeed, Great Britain has underscored this fact by terming the various
155. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, done September 2, 1947, 62 Stat.
1681 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (effective Dec. 3, 1948). For full text of the
Argentine reservation, see Final Act of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance
of Continental Peace and Security, Sept. 2, 1947, 21 U.N.T.S. 116, 173, 175.
156. Hayton, supra note 39, at 593.
157. Claims, supra note 16, at 396.
158. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 155 (emphasis added).
159. Hayton, supra note 39, at 593.
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British Antarctic claims as "the Falkland Islands Dependencies." 160
By so doing, Great Britain has disadvantaged herself in two critical
respects. First, she treats such territories as South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands, both north of the 60th parallel, as "at most
sub-Antarctic, " 161 but her acts in reference to all her Antarctic
claims take place, to a significant extent, in the immediate area of
these islands. Such a position has been recognized as a serious weakness in Britain's application to the Court in 1955. 162 Second, Argentina does not recognize the British claim to the Falkland Islands
themselves. As long ago as 1927, Argentina declared its opposition
to British occupation of the islands: "[d]e jure, the Archipelago of
the Malvinas [Falklands] also belongs to this jurisdiction, but it
cannot be exercised de facto because of the occupation maintained
by Great Britain." 163 And in 1957, Argentina extended her administration over the Falklands, going so far as to designate Ushuaia as
the capital city .164 Regardless of the outcome of the dispute over the
Falklands themselves, Great Britain's chain of sovereignty has arguably been stretched to its tenuous limit.
Finally, it must be stated that in reference to extra-legal arguments in support of her position, Argentina's case is far from inferior. The fact that the British were the first to have applied to the
Court for settlement of the sovereignty issue is a sword which cuts
both ways. "As Judge Lauterpacht says, applications of this nature
may be mere political devices intended to embarass the state whom
it is sought to make defendant." 165 Should the British move be so
viewed, it may well work to the advantage of Argentina rather than
Great Britain. This potential advantage, however, is a minor one
when compared to the other extra-legal considerations which could
well tip the balance in Argentina's favor.
World opinion is an extraordinarily potent force and one the
effect of which will not be lost upon the International Court. Great
Britain is faced with its image as a colonial power, and colonialism
is seriously frowned upon by the world community. Argentina, on
the other hand, has nationalism, with its concomitant values of
self-determination and burgeoning industrialization, on its side. As
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
(1961).

Id. at 588.
P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 313 n.1.
Hayton, supra note 39, at 597 n.67.
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, supra note 114, at 218.
Hanessian, supra note 147, at 152.
R. ANAND, COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

Published by SURFACE, 1977

COURT OF JUSTICE

125

29

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1977], Art. 5

148

Syr. J. Int' I L. & Com.

[Vol. 5:119

one of the world's developing nations, it cannot help but elicit sympathy and support from major powers and underdeveloped countries alike. 166 It has even been suggested, in view of the formidable
potency of world opinion, that Great Britain assign her Antarctic
claims in return for other considerations. 167 While Great Britain's
position is far from being classified as insignificant, nevertheless
"some battles, such as this one over Antarctic sovereignty, are not
worth fighting." 168

Russell W. MacKechnie, Jr.
166. Hayton, supra note 39, at 608.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 609.
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